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CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY IN HUNGARIAN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
The lecture of Csaba Varga, which fills up a long-standing need, provides a pan-
orama of the past 20 years of Hungarian legal philosophy (2/A – C) with an
international outlook (1), a comprehensive analysis of a number of randomly
selected crucial issues, a detailed assessment of the present situation (5 and
passim), and an outline of future perspectives (6). The panorama we will deal
with primarily in this supplementary paper is, within the limits of available
space, almost complete and the accuracy of the overview is imposing. We agree
with many of its substantive elements and the following comments are not intended
to propose any alterations, but rather supplements. This obviously involves the
modification of some accents and a small number of counter-arguments regarding
the contents.
(1) One of the lecture’s main statements is that, at the time of the fall of the
ancien re´gime (1989), there prevailed ‘a kind of continuity and permanence . . . ,
without an expressed break or division’ in Hungarian legal philosophy.247 We fully
agree with this statement while, regarding the grammatical mode of one of the
conclusions derived from that – therefore ‘there was no need for any spectacular
shift in theoretical legal thought’ – we would find it more accurate to apply the
indicative mode. Thus we would say: therefore ‘there was not any spectacular shift
in theoretical legal thought’. This difference in emphasis is substantiated by two
247. A similar attitude was taken in the issue by Be´la Pokol who explained this in the mid 1990s by
the fact that the break from the standpoint of so-called ‘socialist normativism’ as the official
ideology of the communist era had taken place in the writings of Ka´lma´n Kulcsa´r and Vilmos
Peschka partly in the 1970s and in the works of Andra´s Sajo´ and Csaba Varga in the 1980s. See
B. Pokol, Jogbo¨lcseleti vizsga´lo´da´sok (Reflexions in Philosophy of Law), (Nemzeti Tanko¨-
nyvkiado´, Budapest, 1994), pp. 105–108. The same line of development was described by
Pe´ter Szila´gyi’s encyclopaedia entry entitled ‘Jogbo¨lcselet’ (Legal Philosophy) as well;
see Magyarorsza´g a XX. sza´zadban (Hungary in the 20th Century), (Babits, Szeksza´rd,
2000), p. 55. It is discernible, however, from a more sensitive analysis that the idea of ‘con-
tinuity without break’ would probably not be shared by younger generations of those culti-
vating legal theory in Hungary. This can be proven in connection with the evaluation of the
philosophy of the recently deceased Vilmos Peschka. He is regarded by Pe´ter Szila´gyi as the
most outstanding legal philosopher (ibid.) and the same opinion is shared by Pe´ter Szigeti, who
regards Peschka’s oeuvre to be even more ‘original’ than the works of Felix Somlo´ and Barna
Horva´th (see P. Szigeti, ‘A marxista jogelme´let funkcionalita´sa Magyarorsza´gon, 1963 – 1988
ko¨zo¨tt’ (The Functionality of the Marxist Legal Theory between 1963–1988), 2005/2 Leviata´n,
pp. 24–25). However, it is to be conceived as a kind of proof for the possible interruption of the
‘chain novel’ of the Hungarian legal philosophy that Ma´tya´s Bo´dig (M. Bo´dig, ‘Mege´rte´s,
racionalita´s, gyakorlati e´sz’ (Understanding, Rationality, Practical Reason), (2001) Ius Huma-
num, p. 223) had already cautiously criticized Peschka’s hermeneutical approach. (It may be
mentioned as well, that in the field of legal philosophy, Miklo´s Szabo´ is the most radical critic
of the one-time normativist doctrine; see e.g., M. Szabo´, ‘Defensor Dogmatis’ (2004) 4 Vila´-
gossa´g 35.)
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major questions that can be raised in connection with the lecture, with regard to the
relationship of law and legal thought (and consequently of law and legal philos-
ophy), as well as their continuity and the ruptures in them.
(2) One of them is about legal continuity: to what extent is the Hungarian legal
system after 1990 – considering the constitutional character of the transition in
1989–1990 – a ‘continuation’ of the previous one? Our problem is, basically, how
legal theoretical and legal philosophical thinking reacted to the response given to
this question. Anyone who accepts the statement that practically a new legal system
emerged in Hungary in 1990 and in consecutive years248 (which, by the way, fits in
the tradition of Hungarian history abounding in discontinuities, marked by sym-
bolic dates like 1848, 1867, 1918–1920, 1945–1949) has to raise at least two
further questions.
(a) The first question is whether the meaning and function of legal philoso-
phies before 1990 changed in a new social, political and professional context. And
if so, does this affect the evaluation of them? Supposing with Derrida that ‘(une)
e´poque passe´e est en effet constitue´e de part en part comme en texte’,249 these
texts – according to us – will be read in other ways after the caesura, and other
functions will or may be attributed to them.
The lecture did not raise this question, at least in paragraphs 2/A – C. Although
it is not stated explicitly, to a certain extent it is suggested that, the ‘uninterrupted
continuity’ has been carried on – besides a number of enrichments as regards topics
and responses to new challenges – in the Hungarian legal philosophy of the past 15
years, and the former legal thought, in a certain sense, ‘has already contained’ the
latter.
It should be remarked here that this problem, as far as is known to us, has not
been exposed by others in Hungarian legal theory either. Nevertheless it is
necessary to raise this question and to answer it, for the reason that this would
cast a different light on a number of theoretical tendencies that will be exposed in
this paper.
(i) Before indicating major problems of ‘different readings’ of the same texts,
we mention, by way of minor but important example, the relation of Hungarian
legal philosophy to Marxism as a social philosophical background. That is, during
the past 15 years the evaluation of the possibility of a legal theory based on
Marxian foundations has been endlessly changed.
(ii) The fact that the social theory of law has been gaining ground in Hungary
during the 1980s and that undoubtedly this also represented one of the main trends
in the 1990s as well, did not contribute to clarify the relation of Hungarian legal
theory to legal positivism.
248. One of the contradictions in connection with the emergence of the new legal system is dem-
onstrated by the following quote from La´szlo´ So´lyom (allowing ample space for critical
reflections in legal philosophy): ‘Legal certainty – in connection with which the Constitutional
Court refers to legal continuity – gains its significance from political and ideological discon-
tinuity’: see L. So´lyom, Az alkotma´nybı´ra´skoda´s kezdetei Magyarorsza´gon (The Beginning of
Constitutional Adjudication in Hungary), (Osiris, Budapest, 2001), p. 65.
249. J. Derrida, Grammatologie (Les E´ditions de Minuit, Paris, 1967), p. 8.
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The reason for that is that questions posed by the positivity of law within a
social theory of law were sufficiently answered by those authors who – like Be´la
Pokol, Pe´ter Szigeti, Csaba Varga or Pe´ter Szila´gyi – elaborated original and self-
sufficient theories focusing on the law’s so-called ‘layers’, on its role ‘within the
totality of the social normative system’ ontologically founded, or on its ‘proces-
suality’.250 These answers, however, may prove to be inadequate when general and
classical philosophical problems of legal positivism – e.g., the relationship
between law and morality, the normative nature of legal validity, the moral and/
or political aspects of legal interpretation, etc. – have to be solved. Some repre-
sentatives of Hungarian legal theory, like Tama´s Gyo rfi and Ma´tya´s Bo´dig251
(whom we group and coin as members of the ‘Miskolc school’) strove to solve
these general philosophical problems, but – without any hints at particular social
backgrounds – have closed their solutions into the conceptual system of the
common-law based analytical legal theory. This fact – together with the so-called
practical philosophy background of these theories (with just few and incidental
connections to Hungarian legal practice) – made communication almost impossi-
ble with theoretical-professional lawyers, and likewise in respect of the whole of
Hungarian legal philosophy.252
250. Regarding the sources of the literature, see the rich material of the lecture. In this respect we
have in mind especially the following works: B. Pokol, above, and Jogelme´let (Legal Theory),
2001, 2005; P. Szigeti and P. Taka´cs, A joga´llamisa´g jogelme´lete (Legal Theory of the Rule of
Law), (Napvila´g, Budapest, 1996); C. Varga, A jog ta´rsadalomelme´lete fele´ (Towards a Social
Theory of Law). (Budapest, 1999). The same sociological attitude of theoretical approach can
be traced in the subject-centred oeuvre of Anda´s Sajo´, and the work of Andra´s Tama´s spanning
across various fields of disciplines. See, in this respect, also A. Kara´csony, Jogfilozo´fia e´s
ta´rsadalomelme´let (Legal Philosophy and Social Theory), (Pallas Attraktor, Budapest, 2000).
251. As a monographic elaboration see T. Gyo rfi, A korta´rs jogpozitivizmus perspektı´va´i (Perspec-
tives of Contemporary Legal Positivism), (Bı´bor, Miskolc, 2006); M. Bo´dig, Jogelme´let e´s
gyakorlati filozo´fia (Legal Theory and Practical Philosophy), (Bı´bor, Miskolc, 2004), esp.
Chapters I – II, pp. 25–197.
252. The space available here is not sufficient to analyse this problem of communication. Never-
theless it is to be remarked that the issue of the relation to legal positivism and the difference in
the way of thinking according to these two (sociological versus analytical) directions of
Hungarian legal philosophy are most likely connected with the problem of the scientific
character of jurisprudence; viz., in so far as the continental version of positivism has, in
contrast to the Anglo-Saxon one, been motivated, at least partly, by the ideal of ‘scientific
rigour’ demanded by empirical sciences. Thus the fact that the social theory of law has become
dominant and the majority of legal philosophers had increased the focus on legal sociology
during the 1980s and 1990s can be partly explained by the need for getting rid of the ideological
dogmatism. Within the boundaries of ‘continental’ positivism, the statements formulated in the
discourse refer to facts (conceived in a certain sense), in contrast to the present situation when
the participants of the discourse typically contrast arguments with arguments. And if there is,
the ‘final stand’ to be taken by the ‘tribunal of science’ (partly owing also to the spread of
Anglo-Saxon positivism) became significantly relativized. (On the scientific character of
jurisprudence and as markedly differing approaches, among others see A. Sajo´, Kritikai e´rte-
keze´s a jogtudoma´nyro´l (Critical Treatise on Legal Science), (Akade´miai Kiado´, Budapest,
1983); L. Cs. Kiss, A jogtudoma´ny eszme´je e´s hivata´sa (The Idea and the Profession of the
Legal Science), (ELTE A´JK, Budapest, 2004)).
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Thus, in the situation that has emerged, almost the entire Hungarian legal
philosophy (to quote the terminology of the lecture) is ‘struggling’ with the tra-
dition of ‘tight-fisted’ legal positivism. At times we marvel that the ‘past law also
had a kind of positivity’, wondering to find ‘to the stand taken after the disinte-
gration of positivism (in the past 60 years) in Western Europe . . . the positivity of
the law’ had achieved ‘a new interpretation’ (which did not impregnate Hungarian
thinking) and at the same time we are worrying about the ‘future of legal positiv-
ism’. So, in this respect the situation is rather paradoxical and perplexing,253 and
the theoretical approach to it is, on the whole and despite the efforts at clarifica-
tion,254 ambivalent.
(iii) The present state of natural law doctrines does not fare better either. The
emergence of this kind of thinking was an unpredicted and indeed unprecedented
phenomenon in Hungarian legal theory. Of course, we cannot speak about its
‘renaissance’ (as in post-1945 German legal philosophy) but, at the most, – as
Csaba Varga rightly formulates it – about its ‘rehabilitation’. The intellectual
traditions, however, that have played roles in this rehabilitation are rather different
from each other. The most important of them are as follows: (A) After 1990 the
idea of human rights appeared and became generally accepted, and ‘talking in
terms of rights’ became part of constitutional practice; (B) to a certain extent
so-called practical philosophy became accepted; and, additionally, (C) there was
a need for the elaboration of a Weltanschauung-based social and legal philosophy;
nevertheless, this mode of thinking on law – which is partly still outside the domain
of legal philosophy – immediately became subject to (D) criticism, and (E) as the
political transition was peaceful and constitutional in its character (i.e., the valid
law was transformed within constitutional frameworks), the theoretically possible
revolutionary potential of natural law was not accentuated either (except for
attempts at retroactive administration of justice just after the Hungarian Rule of
Law was born).255 Therefore, Hungarian natural law thinking is today still in the
state of an ‘unfinished adventure’.
253. A minor example and indication for this is that in Hungarian jurisprudence – while we have
been witnessing, for a few decades, a ‘creeping and hidden reception of Kelsen’ – to quote the
formulation of L. Cs. Kiss, ‘Hans Kelsen magyar fogadtata´sa’ (The Hungarian Reception of
Hans Kelsen) (2005) 10 Vila´gossa´g, p. 4 – Kelsen’s pure theory of law was, around 1990, not a
quoted reference (with all its theoretical, legal-political and ideological corollaries) either for
the democratic opposition in the political transitions or for the ‘founding fathers’ of our
Constitution, as it did happen, for instance, in post-1945 Italian legal theory or in post-Franco
Spain. As to Italy, see U. Scarpelli, Cos’e` il positivismo giuridico? (Comunita`, Milan, 1965);
for Spain, see A. Calsamiglia, ‘For Kelsen’ (2000) 13 Ratio Juris, pp. 196–215.
254. Among others, see M. Szabo´ (ed.), Natura iuris (Bı´bor, Miskolc, 2002).
255. As the text-like document of paras a-e (see J. Kis, Vannak-e emberi jogaink? (Do We Have
Human Rights?). (Magyar Fu¨zetek, Paris, 1988), reprinted: (Stencil, Budapest, 2003);
G. Halmai and G.A. To´th (eds) Emberi jogok (Human Rights), (Osiris, Budapest, 2003);
J. Sa´ri, Alapjogok (Fundamental Rights), (Osiris, Budapest. 2005); P. Erdo , ‘Vannak-e ter-
me´szetes jogok az emberi jogok mo¨go¨tt?’ (Are There Natural Rights behind Human Rights?),
(1999) 2 Magyar Tudoma´ny 129; F. Ho¨rcher, ‘Egy pragmatikus terme´szetjog fele´’ (Towards a
Pragmatic Natural Law), (1997) 4 Sza´zadve´g 109; J. Frivaldszky, Terme´szetjog (Natural Law),
(Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat, Budapest, 2001); J. Frivaldszky, ‘Egy ma va´llalhato´ terme´szetjogi
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These and similar problems have not been tackled in the lecture, and the line of
the argumentation is broken at times. It is as if the author, metaphorically speaking,
seems to serve two gods, referring, on the one hand, to (Catholic) natural law, as
‘the literally ultimate promise . . . for our world having lost direction and endan-
gered’, while, stating on the other hand, in a different context (in a way reminiscent
of the Scandinavian tradition of legal theory) that ‘the only thing the law has is its
own formality, that is, its being objectivated as a text’. From this we can conclude –
as we consider this situation to be typical of not only the lecture but of the whole of
our legal theory – that the position and the role of natural law as legal philosophy
within the general theory of law, what is more, of a value-oriented legal philos-
ophy,256 have not yet been clarified or at least not been settled in Hungary.
(b) As to the break of legal continuity – assuming that theory has practical
functions, too, in every epoch – we find that a certain kind of question is conspic-
uously missing from the lecture. We mean the question of how Hungarian legal
theory reacted in the past 15 years to a legal system with basically fresh contents,
entirely new institutions, which operates in novel ways in several aspects. So the
question is: has this legal theory processed and worked out the observations and
experiences related to the post-1990 Hungarian legal system?
We assume that legal theory and theoretical legal thought – reflecting the
change of positive law and the practice of new institutions – have begun this
endeavour in several ways and, starting out from several directions, have even
reached a number of achievements, but this work is, on the whole, so far partial and
unfinished.
The fact that the work has started was indicated, among others, by analyses
examining the judicial practice of the Constitutional Court, the parliamentarism or
the role of judicial practice in legal development, and this was extended soon to the
analysis of the statics and dynamics of the legal system (we refer here to only some
random examples, i.e., some examinations published at times in articles and chap-
ters of books).257
elme´let ko¨rvonalai’ (Outlines of a Plausible Doctrine of Natural Law), (2002) Natura iuris 59;
L. Boda, Terme´szetjog, erko¨lcs, huma´num (Natural Law, Morality, Humanity), (Szent Istva´n
Ta´rsulat, Budapest, 2001); S. Tattay, ‘Natural Law and Legal Semiotics: Are They Irreconcil-
able?’ (2006) 2 Jogelme´leti Szemle; A. Sajo´, Jogosultsa´gok (Rights), (MTA A´llam- e´s Jogtu-
doma´nyi Inte´zete - Seneca, Budapest, 1996); A. Sajo´, ‘Az emberi jogok haszontalansa´gairo´l e´s
lehetetlense´geiro l’ (On the Uselessness and Impossibility of Human Rights), (1990) 8/9 Vila´-
gossa´g 573; A. Sajo´, ‘Az emberi jogi ideolo´gia egy pozitı´v korban’ (The Ideology of Human
Rights in a Positivist Age), (1993) 8 Magyar Tudoma´ny 936. For the criteria to distinguish
religious and other, Weltanschaung-based natural law doctrines, see P. Erdo , Egyha´zjog
(Canon Law), (Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat, Budapest), s.a. p. 36.
256. It is Miklo´s Szabo´ whose works seem to most promise the possibility of a value-oriented
classical legal theory but the research direction chosen by him (viz., legal dogmatics, see
below, 2.b) has not yet allowed the detailed explication of this.
257. See references to the ample literature in the lecture (e.g., quoting works by Andra´s Bragyova,
Tama´s Gyo rfi, Be´la Pokol and Antal Visegra´dy), as far as public law is concerned. See also in a
constitutional law respect: B. Pokol, A magyar parlamentarizmus (Hungarian Parliamentar-
ism), (Csere´pfalvi, Budapest, 1994); J. Kis, Alkotma´nyos demokra´cia (Constitutional Democ-
racy), (Indok, Budapest, 2000); L. So´lyom, above. For the structural issues of the legal system
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There are, however, many signs of partiality. For instance, in some (A) impor-
tant areas related to private law, e.g., regarding the theory of property, there was
hardly any legal theoretical research at all, while (B) in others, such as, in contract
law, only occasional attempts took place, and (C) a theory of responsibility was
cultivated, at a level relevant also to the legal theory, only by lawyers specialized to
this field.258 That the project is unfinished is proven by the fact that neither the ‘legal
theory of political transition’ (or rather, its legal sociology), nor the general theory –
covering institutions and the analysis of their mode of operation as well as feeding
on the analysis of these – of the new legal system have still yet to be born.259
see the works by Pe´ter Szila´gyi and Andra´s Jakab, A. Jakab, A jogszaba´lytan fo bb ke´rde´seiro l
(On the Principal Questions of a Theory of Legal Acts), (Unio´, Budapest, 2003) and
P. Szila´gyi, Jogi alaptan (A Study of Basic Legal Concepts), (2nd ed., Osiris, Budapest,
2003); on principles of law, see A. Tama´s, A´llam- e´s jogelme´let (Theory of State and Law),
(Unio´, Budapest, 1998), pp. 143–151; on acquired rights P. Szigeti and P. Taka´cs, above,
pp. 281–283. On the theory of legislation, see A. Tama´s, Legistica (Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat,
Budapest, 1999); on the theory of adjudication, see e.g., M. Bencze, ‘Az ‘‘ı´te´lkeze´stan’’ alap-
vonalai’ (Outlines of the ‘Theory of Adjudication’), (2005) Leviata´n, pp. 229–244.
258. In connection with para. (a) we also refer here to the property-theories of private lawyers; see
e.g., B. Lenkovics, Magyar polga´ri jog. Dologi jog (Hungarian Civil Law. Law of Property),
(6th rev. ed., Eo¨tvo¨s J., Budapest, 2001); F. Ma´dl, ‘A tulajdon rehabilita´cio´ja’ (The Rehabil-
itation of Property), in Liber Amicorum. Studia A. Harmathy dedicata (ELTE A´JK, Budapest,
2003), pp. 209–226; and A. Menyha´rd, ‘A tulajdonjog absztrakt felfoga´sa a maga´njogban’
(The Abstract Concept of the Property in Civil Law), ibid. pp. 227–254. As to property rights,
see in the field of legal philosophy, P. Szigeti, Jogtani e´s a´llamtani alapvonalak (Outlines of
the Theory of Law and State), (Rejtjel, Budapest, 2002), p. 141 et seq. To para. (b) see A. Sajo´,
‘I´ge´ret e´s szerzo de´s: az eszme´k korla´tozott szerepe´ro l’ (Promise and Contract: On the Limited
Role of the Ideas)’ in Eo¨rsi Gyula emle´kko¨nyv. 1922 – 1992 (Festschrift in Honour of Gyula
Eo¨rsi 1922–1992), (Hvg-Orac, Budapest, 2002), pp. 91–133. To para. (g) – referring to the
preliminaries signified in the theory of responsibility in civil law by works of Gyula Eo¨rsi and
La´szlo´ Asztalos, Ferenc Ma´dl and Attila Harmathy, as well as La´szlo´ So´lyom written in the
1960s and 1970s – see A. Fo¨ldi, A ma´se´rt valo´ felelo sse´g a ro´mai jogban jogelme´leti e´s
o¨sszehasonlı´to´ polga´ri jogi kitekinte´ssel (Responsibility for Others in Roman Law with an
Outlook to Legal Theory and Comparative Law), (Rejtjel, Budapest, 2004), esp. Chapters I/1–
5 and IV/3. See also the short e´tudes of Tama´s La´bady, Miklo´s Kira´ly, Ja´nos Zlinszky and the
classical work of Ge´za Marton in a re-edited form (1993). In relation to the theory of respon-
sibility in criminal law, see N. Kis, A buno¨sse´gi elv hanyatla´sa a bu¨nteto jogban (The Decline
of the Principle of Responsibility in the Criminal Law), (Unio´, Budapest, 2005). In the field of
legal philosophy, a synthesis of these researches could have – as the continuation of his earlier
efforts – has been provided by Pe´ter Szila´gyi (cf. P. Szila´gyi, ‘A jogi felelo sse´g alapja – avagy
mire jo´ a felelo sse´gelme´let’ (The Foundation of Responsibility in Law – Or, What the Theory
of Responsibility is Good for), in Felelo sse´g e´s szankcio´ a jogban (Responsibility and Sanction
in Law), (KJK, Budapest, 1980) pp. 57–108; and A szankciona´la´s e´s a szankcio´ a jogi felelo s-
se´gi rendszerben (Execution of the Sanction and Sanction in the System of Legal Responsi-
bility), (KJK, Budapest, 1990).
259. For the sake of accuracy it is to be noted that there has been an attempt to formulate the legal
theory of one of the aspects of the new political order, the institutional structure influenced by
the ideal of the Rule of Law (see Szigeti and Taka´cs, above – in relation to the chapters written
by Pe´ter Szigeti): however, this monograph, published in the form of a textbook, was in fact left
without a substantive critical response.
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The situation is, nevertheless and all things considered, not as bad as it seems.
Our legal theory has one field connected to the ‘living’ legal system, notably, legal
methodology (juristische Methodenlehre) or, as referred to in Hungary by many,
legal dogmatics, where the results are noteworthy without any doubt. The lecture
characterises this as the law’s ‘investigation into the connections between law and
language and logic and rhetoric’, which once ‘used to play a pioneering role’ and
proved to be one of the fields ‘most innovative in its effect’ in the past 20 years in
Hungary. We agree with the evaluation. Namely, several independent methodo-
logical theories (including, besides language, logic and rhetoric, the theory of
interpretation, the theory of argumentation and other fields of legal dogmatics,
not omitting the examination of other elements of legal culture) have emerged over
the past two decades – primarily developed by Miklo´s Szabo´,260 or explicated from
perspectives of legal philosophy and comparative law by Csaba Varga, and within
the general legal theory of Be´la Pokol.261 These theories took into account the
general features of the law and the characteristics of the post-1990 Hungarian legal
system in different ways. The above-mentioned authors, in different ways but
parallel with each other, are in line with the European traditions and meet
contemporary requirements.
(3) The second question in connection with continuity and discontinuity is to
what extent the own traditions of Hungarian legal philosophical thinking (partly
originating from the era before 1989–1990, partly from the epoch before 1945)
assert themselves today. In this respect the lecture provides rather only ‘signs’, e.g.,
when it writes that one research trend or another ‘has obviously arrived from
outside . . . along with . . . its approach’, or that another field ‘so to speak
never regularly cultivated . . . in Hungary earlier’ and in case of a third one
‘the very start of its cultivation is remarkable itself’. This leads us to the conclusion
that Csaba Varga – while he indicates, also correctly, with bibliographical data,
that the intellectual and moral rehabilitation of the pre-1945 Hungarian legal
philosophy has taken place, and has, in fact, been completed – rather accentuates
the novel features of the scholarly development after 1985, examining it in con-
nection with international tendencies.
It is true that the ‘new’ Hungarian legal theory could not return to its pre-
decessors from before 1945 in respects of contents. (After all, legal philosophy
with a pure Neo-Kantian background was uncontinuable at the end of the 20th
260. M. Szabo´, Jogdogmatikai elo ada´sok (Lectures on Legal Dogmatics), (Bı´bor, Miskolc, 1994);
M. Szabo´, A jogdogmatika elo ke´rde´seiro l (On the Preliminary Questions of Legal Dogmatics),
(Bı´bor, Miskolc, 1996); M. Szabo´, Trivium (Bı´bor, Miskolc, 2001); M. Szabo´, Ars iuris (Bı´bor,
Miskolc, 2005).
261. C. Varga, Elo ada´sok a jogi gondolkoda´s paradigma´iro´l (Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal
Thinking), (Osiris, Budapest, 1996, 1997, 1998); C. Varga, A jogi gondolkoda´s paradigma´i
(Paradigms of Legal Thinking), (Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat, Budapest, 2004); C. Varga, A jog mint
logika, rendszer e´s technika (Law as Logic, System and Technique), (Szent Istva´n Ta´rsulat,
Budapest, 2000); B. Pokol, above. Also including the doctrine of legislation into legal meth-
odology conceived of, in a broader sense, see as well the works of Pe´ter Szila´gyi and Andra´s
Tama´s referred to above.
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century.) However, we are of the opinion that, as a result of a more definite
investigation into the relation to the past of some 150 years, the question could
have been raised whether we have – be it good or bad – traditions that have asserted
themselves in the past 15 years as well. In this respect, for instance, the question
arises: has Hungarian legal philosophy produced anything really original during
the last one and a half centuries? Or has it, instead, only played some peripheral
role as a follower? To what extent did it combine reception with tradition? How
did it reconcile the requirements of scholarship with the political aspirations
inherent in the value choices of those cultivating it? These questions are compli-
cated and solving them obviously is not the task of this lecture. We just mention
that one can find – as fittingly formulated by one of the analysts262 – a number of
‘comfortably unreflected’, ‘very well established and compact’ stereotypes in the
related professional literature.
At least according to us, what can be declared in all certainty is that the pre-
1945-traditions of Hungarian legal theory have also continued after 1990 in the
following respects: (a) its representatives are, in their value-choices regarding
Weltanschauung and politics behind the theories, rather divided than unified;
(b) our legal theory is, in an international comparison, on the whole (i.e., with a
few exceptions), rather adaptive than original; (c) it derives its inspirations from
extremely diverse, often counter-running sources, in result of which a number of
individuals cultivating it often rather communicate with ‘abroad’ than with each
other; (d) its international position – quoting and supplementing the proper eval-
uation of the subject’s practised analyst263 – was characterized in the past 15 years
by that what has always been typical of it, that is, it was striving to fill the role of a
worthy partner on an equal footing with others; however, only its most talented
representatives succeeded in achieving this. And last but not least (e) its achieve-
ments will be viewed by both those involved and by posterity as ‘accomplished’
individual oeuvres instead of as results of either schools or of creative
communities.
(4) The lecture’s effort to establish a connection between legal theory, legal
philosophy and theoretical legal thinking is exceptionally enlightening.
Nonetheless there are a number of other theoretical possibilities to interpret this
connection that are still open.
One of these possibilities is to examine what kind of legal theories and legal
approaches operate, consciously or unconsciously, during the formulation of the-
ories, in the minds of professional lawyers analysing the new legal system from the
perspective of different branches of law. To our knowledge, such research has not
yet been conducted in Hungary, with one exception.264
262. M. Szabo´, ‘Megkı´se´rtett humanizmus’ (Seducted Humanism), in M. Szabo´ (ed.), Portre´va´zla-
tok a magyar jogbo¨lcseleti gondolkoda´s to¨rte´nete´bo l (Portraits from the History of Hungarian
Legal Philosophy), (Bı´bor, Miskolc, 1995), p. 1.
263. M. Szabo´ (ed.), ‘A magyar jogbo¨lcseleti gondolkoda´s to¨rte´nete´nek va´zlata’ (A Sketch on
the History of Hungarian Legal Philosophy), in J. Szabadfalvi, Fejezetek a jogbo¨lcseleti
gondolkoda´s to¨rte´nete´bo l (Chapters from the History of Legal Philosophy), (Bı´bor, Mis-
kolc, 2004), p. 39.
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Another aspect of ‘theoretical legal thinking’ is the one referred to above,
namely how those engaged in legal philosophy think. As indicated above (see 2/b),
their mentalite´ has, in reaction to the new institutions and mode of operation of the
changed legal system, changed to a great extent.
What is more, it may perhaps even be stated here that while legal theory was,
before 1990, typically the philosophers’ (and social scientists’ in general) legal
philosophy, today it is rather the lawyers’ legal philosophy.
This – taking into account the requirements involved by the Rule of Law and
also the needs of practising lawyers – has brought about, among others, that con-
cept-analysis and argumentation theory have come into prominence. So, in this
context, the expansion of the Anglo-Saxon-rooted legal analytics and the spread of
the analytical mode of theory formation – spearheaded by representatives of the
‘Miskolc school’ mentioned already – must not be regarded as incidental or result-
ing merely from some ‘extra-scientific’, individual interest. On the contrary, it is a
matter of the change of the theoretical thinking made possible and even inspired by
the new legal milieu.
Similarly, the relaxation of the scholarly discipline of traditional legal
theory265 as well as the evolution of the present diversity – about which the lecture
(with reference to the trends of legal anthropology, law and literature, law and
economics, etc.) reports comprehensively – were inspired by the change of the
legal milieu and made possible by the alteration of the social-political environment
(of the scientific infrastructure).
The interrelation of legal philosophy and its social-political milieu is remark-
able in one more respect. We point to the fact that – apart from a few exceptions266 –
there have been no harsh debates in Hungarian legal philosophy and that, while the
older generation emphasizes continuity, the younger generation engaged in
the cultivation of this discipline either keeps quiet about the legal theory before
the political transition (but its representatives do not deny the past) or selects from
it in an a` la carte manner, signify that the professional community of our legal
philosophy is facing a generational clash. And, as these generations think accord-
ing to different patterns, in the future this will also doubtlessly affect the character
of our ‘theoretical legal thinking’.
264. Also this exception is only partial as far as it is related to the intention. One of the initial
objectives (true, realized, eventually only to a modest degree) of the conference entitled ‘The
Legal Philosophy of the Marxism of Socialism’ (2003) was namely to examine to what extent
the elements of Marxist and socialist legal thinking are present in analyses of professional law
(civil law, criminal law, constitutional law, etc.) ten years after the political transition.
265. Regarding the lowering of disciplinary boundaries, we think of the works by Attila Bado´, Pe´ter
Cserne, Istva´n H. Szila´gyi, Sa´ndor Loss (y2004) and Tama´s Nagy, mostly quoted in the lecture
of Csaba Varga.
266. In this respect see – especially on the virtual pages of Jogelme´leti Szemle (Review of Legal
Theory), <www.ajk.elte.hu/jesz>, a lively intellectual forum (e. g., 2003/1–2; 2004/4 and
2006/1), and partly in other sources – the debates between Ma´tya´s Bo´dig, Ma´tya´s Bence,
Andra´s Jakab and Be´la Pokol, as well as Ma´tya´s Bo´dig, plus Tama´s Gyo rfi and Lajos Cs.
Kiss, as well as Ma´tya´s Bo´dig and Pe´ter Szigeti, too.
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(5) The author of the lecture sees correctly that the cultivation of legal phi-
losophy as a discipline and the development of theoretical legal thinking are, in
addition to other factors, significantly determined by the infrastructure (financial
allocation, publishing, international relations, system of academic qualification,
etc.), too. We also agree with Csaba Varga in the evaluation of this – the devel-
opments of the past two decades have been incredibly hopeful in this field.
Nevertheless the accents of the lecture must be modified at least on one point.
The relation of universitas and academia has significantly changed over the
past 20 years. No doubt, the most spectacular change was that one of the academy’s
functions in the field of legal policy and politics, characteristic between 1948 and
1990 (viz., the formation of an official legal ideology also appearing in textbooks
the control and as well as the substantive determination of university education)
had ceased, with the academy’s direct influence on the political directives with
regard to the scientific activity having changed. In this situation (made more
complex by the diversity allowed by the democratic political milieu) universities
acted independently and they fulfilled their (primarily educational) duty, which
has, by the way, a crucial role – through the education of practising lawyers – also
in operating the institutional system of the Rule of Law. As lawyers in Hungary are
still being trained basically within ‘faculties of law’, in the meantime they were
also cultivating science.267 Within this, they also tried, besides other tasks, to
perform (with varying success) a part of the scholarly duties (e.g., the practical
training for the scholarly profession and the basically European cooperation) not
performed by the academy due to other factors. Nevertheless, there has not evolved
any consensus in the past 15 years between the two institutions regarding the
relation between the cultivation of scholarship and the training of lawyers, the
division of the relevant duties or the role and weight of factors involved in this
relation. This can be traced back to on the one hand the lawyers’ training shifting
contents, and disproportional size due to mistaken political decisions, and on the
other hand the change in the academy’s position also in terms of finances and
funding. For these reasons this relation in the field of jurisprudence in general can
nowadays be described as deteriorated and burdened by conflicts, while a
substantial part of the scholarly performance of our legal theory of the past two
decades, no matter how we evaluate it, is institutionally connected to the faculties
of law.
(6) According to the lecture’s assessment Hungarian legal philosophy is now
found – after its representatives performed, over the past 20 years, to be an
extremely comprehensive, intensive and, from a professional aspect, highly rep-
utable work – in a kind of state of ‘calm before the storm’.268 Although – as we can
read – ‘there have been neither major breakthroughs nor shifts of emphasis in the
267. As far as known to us, it has not yet been examined by anyone whether monographs in the
forms of textbooks, collections, manuals, etc. have any separate scientific value in themselves
(beyond that of transmitting information), and if they have, of what character and scope it is. It
is a fact, however – and it is often an unpleasant one for law students – that textbook authors
write their texts quite frequently (also) for their colleagues.
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past one to two decades’, the various tendencies ‘indicate’ ‘the potentiality of a
strong impulse that may grow to changes with a milestone’s significance in the
near future’.
Maybe, this is (will) and maybe this is (will) not (be) so – i.e., in our opinion,
the ‘new start’ regarding the future can neither be predicted nor excluded. What we
know for sure is that great intellectual accomplishments have on the whole never
stood alone but have been produced by masterminds who happened to get into a
historically and intellectually favourable medium. At the moment the historical,
spiritual and intellectual situation seems to be very encouraging. So the best we can
do – with regard to the past 20 years’ achievements – is to be trusting and wishing
them the best.
268. This impression is even accentuated by the evaluation about the international environment as
the lecture maintains that – while the Anglo-Saxon legal analytics, rejected by practical legal
science, has became ‘over-emphasized’ in intellectual weight – classical European legal phi-
losophy is waiting for a change of paradigms. As far as we are concerned we are of the opinion
that there has indeed not been a breakthrough amounting to a change of paradigms in classical
legal theory at the international level over the past 45 years; but (in addition to the hundreds of
excellent monographs written by authors like Chaı¨m Perelman, Norberto Bobbio, Robert
Alexy, Joseph Raz and several others who cannot be mentioned here for limits of space) in
the era treated by the lecture, there have emerged a dozen significant works like Law’s Empire
(1986), Faktizita¨t und Geltung (1992) and La globalizacio´n del derecho (1998). This leads us
to conclude that the picture is far from being as gloomy as suggested by the lecturer. At the
same time we also think that, although this may influence Hungarian legal philosophy, it is not
this fact that determines its present status and future prospects.
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